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ONGOING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN IN THE WAKE OF WAL-MART V. DUKES
INTRODUCTION
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al. is the largest employ-
ment class action lawsuit in United States history, touching the
lives of 1.5 million former and current female employees of the
largest employer in the United States.' In 2001, Betty Dukes
and six former employees filed suit against Wal-Mart in the
Northern District of California, alleging the corporation's pro-
motion and salary policies discriminated against women in viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Plaintiffs
alleged that women employed by Wal-Mart were paid less than
men employed in similar positions; that women also received
fewer promotions to managerial positions; and that women were
humiliated by company executives, including a district manager
holding meetings at a local Hooter's restaurant and senior man-
agers referring to female store associates as "little Janie O's." 3
The plaintiffs based their claims on Wal-Mart's highly subjective
intra-corporate systems, which allow individual managers a
broad level of discretion in determining eligibility for raises and
promotions.4 Defendant Wal-Mart stressed its official company-
wide policy barring discrimination based on sex as well as its
consistent efforts to foster diversity among its employees.5
1 Richard Thompson Ford, Discounting Discrimination: Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Proves that Yesterday's Civil Rights Laws Can't Keep Up With Today's Econ-
omy, 5 HARV. L. & PoL'Y REV. 69, 71 (2011).
2 Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systematic Disparate Treatment Law: After
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. 395, 406 (2011).
3 Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 153-55 (2012).
4 Id. at 153.
5 Green, supra note 2, at 415 n.83 (describing the arguments made in Wal-
Mart's appellate brief).
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Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure delineates
numerous requirements for class action lawsuits.6 Class certifi-
cation requires proof that Rule 23's requirements are ade-
quately satisfied, necessitating a preliminary inquiry beyond the
mere face of the pleadings required by Rule 12(b)(6), which sets
the minimum standard for pleadings and motions as a matter of
law.7 Whether the litigation can move forward as a class action
depends on whether or not the class meets Rule 23's require-
ments. 8 If a district court certifies a class and plaintiffs are al-
lowed to proceed, many additional plaintiffs can join the suit in
claims that would not otherwise be brought on an individual ba-
sis.9 If a class is certified and allowed to proceed, defendants
often seek resolution by settlement to avoid potential payoffs
that would dramatically affect the defendant corporation's struc-
ture and operations.10
Although the plaintiff class in this case was certified by the
District Court of Northern California and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court ultimately
denied certification." Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
stated that the plaintiffs failed to prove that Wal-Mart operated
under a general policy of discrimination.12 Plaintiffs put forward
sociological and statistical evidence to substantiate their claims
including regressions, statistical analyses, and testimony from
employees.13 Scalia described this evidence as "worlds away
from significant proof that Wal-Mart operated under a general
6 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
7 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
9 Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 99 (2009). Many plaintiffs working minimum wage jobs
at places like Wal-Mart cannot afford the cost of litigation against a large
corporation like Wal-Mart, which has significant resources at its disposal. See
also Andrew J. Trask, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Class Actions and Legal Strategy,
CATO SuP. CT. REV. 319, 323 (2011).
10 Id.
11 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541.
12 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
13 Id. at 2553-55.
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policy of discrimination."14 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg ana-
lyzed the majority's refusal to certify the class, indicating that
dismissal of the issue was inappropriate without analyzing the
applicable portion of Rule 23, which the majority failed to do.15
In failing to address the question or allow an opportunity for
potential legal redress, the ideologically divided Court evinced
its own biases as well as a broader societal unwillingness to ac-
knowledge ongoing employment discrimination against women
throughout the nation. Because of the incredibly stringent bur-
den of proof established by the majority in Dukes, many future
class action lawsuits involving claims of discrimination will be
unable to go forward. The majority's refusal to certify the class
simultaneously closes potential avenues of legal redress while al-
lowing monolithic companies to continue implementing decen-
tralized corporate policies that disadvantage women. Despite
official corporate policies prohibiting discrimination, an ethos
tolerating unarticulated, subliminal discrimination continues to
plague corporate America.16
Part II of this note discusses past and present employment
discrimination against women in the United States by citing rel-
evant legislation and statistics. This portion of the note explains
first and second generation discrimination and describes corpo-
rate policies perpetuating ongoing employment discrimination.
Part III discusses relevant details of the plaintiffs' and defen-
dant's arguments. It outlines the procedural posture and evolu-
tion of the case, describes denial of Supreme Court certification,
and outlines relevant legal criticism articulated in the dissent.
Part IV of this note discusses the broad implications of the
Court's decision on future class action lawsuits, explains the
commonality requirement of Rule 23, and describes the impact
14 Id. at 2553-54.
15 Id. at 2567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
16 See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportu-
nity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, (1995) (describing how the phenomenon of un-
conscious discrimination can influence decision-making even when it appears
the decision maker is following neutral policies).
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of Dukes on class action litigation. It also analyzes the defense
arguments of Lochnerian procedural due process and the lack of
incentive for corporate change.17 Part V discusses the future of
social framework analysis and expert testimony. It outlines dif-
ferent theories of discrimination as a basis for relief and the
changing burdens of proof before and after Dukes. This portion
of the note also describes uses of social framework testimony, its
connection to the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the effect of
barring social framework testimony, all in the context of class
action litigation. Part VI describes potential avenues of redress
for the Dukes plaintiffs, including filing smaller class action law-
suits, imposing tort liability theory against corporations, and
starting a voluntary refund program for consumers as an alter-
native to class action litigation. This portion of the note also
discusses Home Depot as an example of a large corporation that
positively changed its employment practices through internal
reform.
Finally, this note concludes by discussing the feminist implica-
tions of the Dukes decision and highlighting the need to ac-
knowledge employment discrimination as a pervasive issue.18 It
also presents innovative solutions to employment discrimination
against women and minorities throughout America.
II. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN:
PAST AND PRESENT
This part describes past and present employment discrimina-
tion against women in the United States by citing relevant legis-
lation and statistics. It will explain first and second generation
discrimination and describe corporate policies that perpetuate
ongoing employment discrimination against women and
minorities.
17 The Lochner era of the Court favored big business by attempting to grant
corporations the same rights as persons under the law.
18 See infra Part VII.
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A. Relevant Legislation and Statistics
Historically, women suffered significant discrimination in the
workplace.' 9 In an effort to combat wage inequality between
men and women, Congress passed the Equal Pay Act in 1963.20
One year later, Congress also passed Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act to prohibit sex discrimination in all employment re-
lated contexts.21
While women have made considerable strides as a result of
this and similar legislation, sex discrimination continues to be an
ongoing problem in the American labor market. 22 Women con-
tinue to earn significantly less than men who hold similar posi-
tions.23 In fact, women earn seventy-six cents for every dollar
that men earn.24 While women comprise approximately half of
the workforce, they occupy only thirty percent of salaried mana-
gerial positions, twenty percent of middle management posi-
tions, and five percent of executive positions.25
B. First and Second Generation Discrimination
One way to look at this historical trend is through the lens of
Susan Sturm's theoretical work. Sturm differentiated between
two types of workplace discrimination.26 She used the term
"first generation discrimination" to denote blatant discrimina-
tion through overt exclusion, segregation of job opportunities,
19 See generally Myrtle P. Bell, Mary E. McLaughlin, & Jennifer M. Se-
quiera, Discrimination, Harassment, and the Glass Ceiling: Women as Execu-
tive Change Agents, 37 J. Bus. ETHICs, 65, 66 (2002).
20 Karen M. Wolford, Gender Discrimination in Employment: Wage Inequity
for Professional and Doctoral Degree Holders in the United States and Possi-
ble Remedies, 31 U. ILL. J. EDuc. FIN., 82, 83 (2005).
21 Bell et al., supra note 19, at 65
22 Ford, supra note 1, at 79.
23 Bell et al., supra note 19, at 65.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 465-74 (2001).
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and conscious stereotyping against women and minorities.27
First generation discrimination sought remedies through formal
rule-regulated redress: rules prohibiting unequal treatment
based on race and gender; rules to provide back pay to victims
of discrimination; and rules to ensure implementation of reme-
dial and preventative measures. 28
It is important to note that class action litigation was an im-
portant tool of the civil rights movement to combat first genera-
tion discrimination.29 Class action litigation addresses a
collective injury, which encompasses "a pattern and practice of
discrimination."30 Sturm described "smoking gun" examples of
discrimination as explicit statements against a particular group
of people (i.e. Irish need not apply).3' Rule 23(b)(2) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure was used during the civil rights
movement to strike down facially discriminatory legislation and
promote integration.32
By contrast, "second generation discrimination" occurs as the
result of animus on a more subliminal, individualized level to
disadvantaged members of particular minority groups in soci-
ety.33 Bias often evinces itself in subtle ways that are difficult to
trace to particular individuals or policies.34 Today, it remains
difficult to prove specific instances of sex or race discrimination
if the facts presented fail to establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination.35 Statistics can indicate the pervasiveness of dis-
crimination within a company but do not provide information
about specific individuals who may have experienced or been
subject to discrimination.36
27 Id. at 466.
28 Id. at 467.
29 Ford, supra note 1, at 75.
30 Id.
31 Sturm, supra note 26, at 459-60.
32 Ford, supra note 1, at 75; Andrew J. Trask, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Class Ac-
tions and Legal Strategy, CATO SuP. CT. REv. 319, 324 (2011).
33 Sturm, supra note 26, at 468-69.
34 Id.
35 Ford, supra note 1, at 78.
36 Id. at 75.
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Sturm described "a second generational manifestation of
workplace bias" as such because corporate policies are not
facially discriminatory. 37 Instead of overt exclusion based on
conscious, deliberate stereotypes, workplace bias manifests itself
through the actions of particular individuals.38 Bias can rarely
be seen unless viewed collectively.39
C. Corporate Policies Perpetuating Employment
Discrimination
Sturm's work allows us to see that companies contribute to
the existence of second generation discrimination by creating
flexible decision-making systems. 40 Variable decision-making
systems exist in place of formally articulated, rule-driven poli-
cies for employment related decisions. 41 Ambiguous criteria
provide insufficient guidance for employees in positions requir-
ing decision-making. 42 These policies undermine efforts at
compliance with official corporate policies prohibiting discrimi-
nation.43 The Dukes plaintiffs made this exact argument, stating
that Wal-Mart's policies, with respect to salary and promotion,
are overly broad, rendering them vulnerable to subjectivity,
bias, and discrimination. 44
As Justice Ginsburg so aptly described in her dissent, gender
discrimination and exclusion occur in a largely diffuse way. 4 5
Second generation discrimination often occurs in the absence of
clear, corporate compliance policies delineating appropriate cri-
teria for promotions and salary increases.46 Without formal
rules or policies to incentivize compliance, employees in posi-




41 Id. at 461.
42 Sturm, supra note 26, at 461
43 Id.
44 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011).
45 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
46 Sturm, supra note 26, at 462.
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tions of authority are susceptible to personal bias infiltrating
their decision-making processes. 47
III. THE WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. DUKES LITIGATION
This part briefly explains Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and outlines the Rule's stipulated requirements for a
class action lawsuit. It also discusses relevant details of the
plaintiffs' and defendant's arguments, including the plaintiffs' al-
legations, grounds for redress, and the evidentiary basis for the
plaintiffs' allegations. It outlines the procedural posture and
evolution of the case including rulings of the District Court and
the Court of Appeals. It describes denial of certification by the
Supreme Court and the majority's criticism of social framework
analysis. This part also explains relevant legal criticism articu-
lated in the dissent including a defense of social framework
analysis.
A. Class Action Litigation and Rule 23
The essential question in all class action litigation is class cer-
tification.48 If the trial court cannot certify a proposed class, the
litigation cannot proceed as a class action.49 Thus, meeting the
class certification requirements found in Rule 23 is of the utmost
importance to the plaintiffs' case.
Rule 23 has several requirements. Rule 23(a) ensures a
threshold inquiry into whether a suit is appropriate to bring as a
class action.50 Specifically, whether a class can be certified is
contingent upon members of the class suffering a common
wrong because of the named defendant.51 This requires a
threshold inquiry into whether a suit is appropriate to bring as a
class action.52 Rule 23(a)(2) allows for certification of a plaintiff
47 Id. at 485.
48 Weiss, supra note 3 at 132.
49 See FED. R. Civ. PRO. 23(a).
50 FED. R. Civ. PRo. 23(a).
51 Id.
52 Id.
DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GENDER & L. [Vol. 2:2180
class only if "there are questions of law or fact common to the
class."53 This is known as the "commonality requirement."S4
Commonality is the legal linchpin in all class action litigation
because it is the key to class certification and must be present
for the litigation to go forward.55
The depth and intent of the commonality requirement is in-
credibly controversial. Numerous civil procedure professors
contend that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure intended a simple inquiry, not a determination of the mer-
its.56 Richard Nagareda, a civil procedure professor at New
York University School of Law, disagrees, and argues that exis-
tence of a genuine dispute over satisfying the requirements of
certification per Rule 23 is insufficient to certify a class.57 This
crucial area of disagreement in the Dukes litigation is explored
throughout the majority as well as dissenting opinions.58 Justice
Scalia relied heavily on Professor Nagareda's interpretation of
Rule 23 in the majority opinion, while the dissent favored the
former interpretation.59
In class action lawsuits addressing discrimination against
women and minorities, social framework analysis is used by
plaintiff classes to satisfy the commonality requirement.60 In the
Dukes litigation, the testimony of Dr. William Bielby, an organi-
zational psychologist specializing in organizational behavior and
personnel practices, identified the high amount of discretion
given to managers for salary and promotional purposes as con-
tributing to bias and stereotyping.61 This is another important
area of disagreement and controversy. The use of social frame-
53 FED. R. Civ. PRO. 23(a)(2).
54 Green, supra note 2, at 405-06.
ss Id.
56 Weiss, supra note 3 at 134.
57 Nagareda, supra note 9, at 114.
58 See generally Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
59 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
60 Id. at 2549.
61 Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
37, 49-50 (2009).
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work analysis is a crucial vehicle for plaintiffs to prove that their
allegations are true.62 Discrediting social framework evidence
and altering the bar for its admission has tremendous conse-
quences for the future of class action litigation.
Rule 23(b)(2) and (3) primarily address and determine appro-
priate legal remedies. Rule 23(b)(2) requires a decisive degree
of similarity among members of the proposed plaintiff class.63
Courts allow class actions to proceed under Rule 23(b)(2) if
there are no fundamental differences in the legal remedy re-
quested by the plaintiff class.' 4 Rule 23(b)(2) implicitly "as-
sumes 'a homogeneous and cohesive group with few conflicting
interests among its members.'" 6 5 Similarly, courts denying certi-
fication view unsuccessful class action claims as individual in na-
ture and, therefore, unsuitable to treatment as a cohesive group
of plaintiffs.66
Rule 23(b)(3) is known as the predominance requirement,
and it requires plaintiffs to show first that common issues
predominate over individual issues and claims,67 and second that
a class action is the best legal mechanism to address the plain-
tiffs' claim.68 Many courts assess the predominance requirement
component of the Rule by examining the extent of common re-
lief requested and by determining defendant liability and causa-
tion.69 Once the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) is
satisfied, then the predominance requirement determines
whether differences exist within the class that would make class
action litigation an inappropriate legal remedy. 70 These points
are addressed at length later in this note, particularly in the con-
62 Id. at 39.
63 Nagareda, supra note 9, at 110.
6 Weiss, supra note 3, at 151.
65 Mark Moller, Class Action Defendants' New Lochnerism, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 319, 325 (2012) (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402,
413 (5th Cir. 1998).
66 Green, supra note 2, at 11.
67 Andrew J. Trask, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Class Actions and Legal Strategy,
CATO SuP. CT. REV. 319, 323 (2011).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 325-26.
70 Id. at 322-23.
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text of analyzing the majority and dissenting opinions in
Dukes.71
B. Background
The Dukes litigation began with seven named plaintiffs.72
Plaintiff Betty Dukes and her colleagues brought an action on
behalf of themselves and 1.5 million female employees of Wal-
Mart, alleging that the corporation denied female employees
equal pay or promotions on the basis of sex, in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.73 The plaintiffs claimed that
the broad discretion given to local managers over pay and pro-
motions was exercised disproportionately in favor of men, which
led to an unlawful disparate impact on female employees.74
Plaintiffs alleged that women employed by Wal-Mart were
paid less than their male colleagues every year in every geo-
graphical region.75 The plaintiffs supported their position by
providing evidence demonstrating that women in hourly posi-
tions made an average of $1,100 less than men annually, while
the average difference in salaried management positions be-
tween women and men was $14,500 annually.76 Plaintiffs argued
that women were promoted less often than men, and had to wait
longer to receive promotions.77 Plaintiffs also stated that gender
disparities existed because Wal-Mart's system allowed for exces-
sive amounts of managerial discretion regarding raises and pro-
motions.78 The sweeping discretionary policies, they argued,
allowed the individual's bias to creep into the decision-making
process, disparately impacting women throughout the
company.79
71 See infra notes 100-139 and accompanying text.
72 Trask, supra note 67, at 328
73 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
74 Id. at 2548.
75 Hart, supra note 61, at 48.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 49.
78 Hart, supra note 61, at 49.
79 Id.
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Plaintiffs used a variety of sources to substantiate their allega-
tions, including statistical studies, testimony of social scientists,
testimony of managers and other employees, and testimony of
women making allegations of gender discrimination against
Wal-Mart.80 Plaintiffs particularly emphasized the work of Dr.
Bielby, whose report cited a number of statistics demonstrating
that Wal-Mart's allowances for discretion and subjectivity in its
salary and promotional practices were colored by gender
discrimination.81
Specifically, the report showed that although seventy-two per-
cent of Wal-Mart employees were women, only one-third of
Wal-Mart's managers were women.82 Women comprised less
than ten percent of all store managers, approximately four per-
cent of all district managers, and only one of the twenty execu-
tive positions in the entire corporation.93 This report, a form of
social framework evidence,84 was used by plaintiffs in aiq effort
to satisfy Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement among mem-
bers of the plaintiff class.85
The Dukes plaintiffs articulated two theories in their plead-
ings as a basis for relief: systemic disparate treatment theory,
and systemic disparate impact theory.86 Under systemic dispa-
rate treatment theory, even when no prima facie evidence of dis-
crimination exists, plaintiffs can cite statistics and other evidence
to demonstrate widespread discrimination (based on a protected
characteristic) throughout a company.87 Under this theory, an
employer is liable for facially neutral policies which dispropor-
tionately affect protected groups.88
80 Green, supra note 2, at 407.
81 Hart, supra note 61, at 49-50.
82 Green, supra note 2, at 407 n.47.
83 Id.
84 See infra Part IV.
85 Hart, supra note 61, at 50.
86 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547-48 (2011).
87 Green, supra note 2, at 401.
88 Id.
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Defendant Wal-Mart moved to strike a substantial portion of
the evidence submitted by the proposed plaintiff class. 89 Wal-
Mart offered its own proof to defeat plaintiffs' arguments in
favor of commonality, typicality, and adequate representation,
particularly striking at Dr. Bielby's social framework analysis of
Wal-Mart's corporate culture.9o Wal-Mart used statistical evi-
dence, contending that respondents' monetary claims could not
be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) for two reasons. 91 First, Wal-
Mart claimed that the Rule addresses only injunctive and declar-
atory relief, and does not address the question of monetary
damages in the form of back pay in this case. 92 Second, Wal-
Mart claimed that back pay claims could not be manageably
tried without depriving Wal-Mart of its due process right to pre-
sent certain statutory defenses. 93 Wal-Mart also argued that the
size of the class dispelled the notion of commonality. 94 Because
of the sheer number of plaintiffs comprising the class, there
were certainly numerous variations in the types of claims the
court would have to resolve.95
C. Procedural Posture
The District Court certified the class, stating that respondents
satisfied Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2)'s requirements.96 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed, stating that
respondents met Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement, and
that back pay claims could be certified as a part of the 23(b)(2)
class.97 The Court of Appeals stated that evidence of common-
ality sufficed to raise a common question among class members
as to whether Wal-Mart's female employees were subject to a





94 Dukes 131 S. Ct. at 2549.
95 Trask, supra note 67, at 340.
96 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2549.
97 Id. at 2549-2550.
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single set of corporate policies that unlawfully discriminated
against women in violation of Title VII, and did not merely ex-
perience a number of independent discriminatory acts.98 The
Ninth Circuit further stated that the plaintiffs' claims were suffi-
ciently typical of the class as a whole to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3),
and the named plaintiffs could serve as class representatives.99
D. Supreme Court Decision Regarding Class Certification
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia authored the opinion
of the Supreme Court and focused his analysis on the common-
ality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).100 Throughout the majority
opinion, Scalia frequently cited the work of Professor Nagareda,
who stated that the language of Rule 23(a)(2) is frequently mis-
read because any well-crafted argument can raise questions
common to a class of people.101 Scalia adamantly maintained
that commonality requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that class
members have suffered the same injury based on a common
contention capable of class-wide resolution.102
Scalia stated that because the plaintiffs' claims lacked "signifi-
cant proof" that an employer "operated under a general policy
of discrimination," it was impossible to say that examination of
all the class members' claims would produce a common answer
to the discrimination question.103 Scalia articulated that the only
convincing evidence presented by plaintiffs involved Wal-Mart's
discretionary policy allowing local supervisors latitude in regard
to employment matters.' 0 4 However, the mere possibility that a
Title VII claim could have existed does not mean that it actually
existed.105
98 Id. at 2549.
99 Id.at 2550.
100 Id.
101 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 2553.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 2554.
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Scalia characterized Dukes' litigation as an attempt to prove
that the discrimination endured by Dukes and other female em-
ployees of Wal-Mart was common to all of Wal-Mart's female
employees.106 Scalia stated that the basic theory of the plain-
tiffs' case was that "a strong and uniform 'corporate culture'
permits bias against women to infect, perhaps subconsciously,
the discretionary decision-making of each one of Wal-Mart's
thousands of managers-thereby making every woman at the
company the victim of one common discriminatory practice."107
For the Dukes plaintiffs, Wal-Mart's refusal to reign in its man-
agers' authority amounted to both systemic disparate treatment
as well as systemic disparate impact.108 Scalia responded to this
assertion by saying that the plaintiffs failed to identify a com-
mon mode of exercising discretion within the company.109
The Court struck down the social framework analysis based
on Dr. Bielby's work and statistical regressions performed by
Dr. Drogin, another expert witness.110 Scalia claimed that plain-
tiffs' data was "worlds away from 'significant proof' that Wal-
Mart operated under a general policy of discrimination.""' He
stated that in a company of Wal-Mart's size, it was unlikely that
all managers would exercise their discretion in a similar fashion
without some common direction.112 Merely showing that Wal-
Mart's policy of discretion produced a sex-based disparity was
insufficient."1 Because plaintiffs failed to identify a common
mode of abusing discretion, they could not demonstrate a dis-
criminatory employment practice.114 Scalia stated that claims
for back pay, even if taken at face value, were improperly certi-
fied under Rule 23(b)(2), and that Wal-Mart had the right to
106 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548.
107 Id.
108 Green, supra note 2, at 407.
109 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2555.
110 Id. at 2554-55.
I Id.at 2554.
112 Id. at 2555.
113 Id. at 2556.
114 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2555.
20121 ONGOING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 187
DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GENDER & L.
assess each claim individually to determine whether plaintiffs
are entitled to any kind of back pay or damages.115
E. Dissent
Representing the minority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg au-
thored a partial concurrence as well as a dissent in the case.116
While Ginsburg and the minority agreed that the class should
not have been certified under Rule 23(b)(2), she analyzed the
remaining portion of the majority opinion in a thoughtful dis-
sent." 7 Ginsburg pointed out that the Court improperly focused
on Rule 23(b)(3), pointing instead to Rule 23(a) as the relevant
portion of the Rule for this case."18 She cited Scalia's agreement
with Professor Nagareda's perspective and reframed the argu-
ment. 19 Ginsburg clarified that both Nagareda and the Advi-
sory Committee of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
explained that Rule 23(a)(2)-requiring questions of law or fact
common to the class-is the vital preliminary requirement for
maintaining a class action.120 The District Court found that
plaintiffs easily met the requirement of "one significant issue
common to the class."121 Absent an error of law or an abuse of
discretion, an appellate body cannot alter the District Court's
finding of commonality.122
Ginsburg analyzed the statistics submitted by the plaintiffs
and stated that they were largely uncontested.123 She examined
Wal-Mart's compensation policies as well as the discretionary
decisions made by Wal-Mart supervisors, and stated that the
policies for promotion and compensation in place at Wal-Mart
were uniform throughout the country, and were not created in a
115 Id. at 2557.
116 Id. at 2561.
117 Id. at 2561-62.
118 Id.




123 Id. at 2563.
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vacuum.124 In addition to continuous monitoring of stores, there
were frequent meetings to reinforce a common corporate cul-
ture and transfers of managers to ensure uniformity throughout
the country. 1 2 5
Ginsburg said that "gender bias suffused Wal-Mart's company
culture," particularly evinced by comments including senior
management referring to female associates as "little Janie Os,"
managers telling employees that "men are here to make a career
and women aren't," and the limiting of career advancement op-
portunities for women within Wal-Mart.126 In response to the
majority's attack on the social framework analysis and statistical
data presented by the plaintiffs, Ginsburg stated that Dr. Drogin
adequately controlled for gender-neutral variables. 27 She said
that the statistical regressions could be viewed as adequately de-
monstrative proof of gender discrimination within the stores
themselves.128
Ginsburg also cited Watson v. Fort Worth Bank Trust, which
held that "discretionary employment practices" can give rise to
Title VII claims not only when motivated by discriminatory in-
tent, but also when they produce discriminatory results.129 In
Watson, the Court held that disparate impact analysis applies to
subjective employment practices, particularly with respect to
"an employer's undisciplined system of subjective decision-mak-
ing . . ." causing exclusion or the expression of bias.130 In accor-
dance with the Watson standard, subjective employment
practices that produce a disparate impact against women and
people of color should prompt an inquiry into those practices.131
124 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2563.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 2563-64.
127 Id. at 2564.
128 Id.
129 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2564-65.
130 Id. at 2554 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
990 (1988)).
131 Id. at 2565.
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Specifically, courts should investigate the adequacy, fairness,
and accountability that produce the disparate impact.132
Ginsburg's assertion that risk is heightened when managers
are predominantly of one sex and "steeped in a corporate cul-
ture that perpetuates gender stereotypes" was derived from
logic taken straight from Watson. 33 In Watson, the Court took
particular note of the subjective reasons the employer utilized to
make promotional decisions, and stated that the absence of for-
mal criteria for evaluating candidates mandated an analysis
under disparate impact.134 Ginsburg noted that discriminatory
employment practices give rise to Title VII claims not only be-
cause of a motive to discriminate, but also when they produce
discriminatory results.135
Ginsburg also criticized the majority for its failure to recog-
nize a key issue in the case: whether Wal-Mart's discretionary
pay and promotion policies were actually discriminatory.136
Ginsburg accused the majority and its vigorous endorsement of
Nagareda's views of blending crucial threshold criteria of Rule
23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement with 23(b)(3)'s predomi-
nance requirement to create a much more stringent and rigorous
test.13 Ginsburg maintained that dissimilarities among mem-
bers of the class per Rule 23(b)(1) should not bar a class from
proceeding as long as the threshold commonality requirements
of Rule 23(a) are sufficiently addressed.138 The majority's focus
on dissimilarity misguided its analysis, leading it away from the
Watson precedent which established that a system of delegated
discretion is actionable under Title VII when it produces dis-
criminatory outcomes.139
132 Id.
133 Id. at 2564.
134 Watson, 487 U.S. at 988, 991.
135 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2564-65.
136 Id. at 2565.
137 Id. at 2565.
138 Id. at 2566.
139 Id. at 2567.
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IV. BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF DUKES FOR FUTURE CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION
This part will discuss the broad implications of the Court's de-
cision in Dukes on future class action lawsuits and litigation, in-
cluding a general description of class action litigation and the
interpretations of Rule 23. This section also analyzes the de-
fense argument of Lochnerian procedural due process and the
lack of incentive for corporations to change their policies in the
wake of Dukes.
A. Interpreting Rule 23
The plaintiff class in Dukes sought redress as a class because
class action lawsuits allow a large number of people access to
courts, avoiding the cost of litigating similar claims that would
occur without the possibility of consolidating them.14 0 Without
combining their efforts as a class, it is unlikely that the Dukes
plaintiffs could individually afford adequate legal representation
against a corporate monolith like Wal-Mart.
Rule 23(a) ensures a threshold inquiry into whether a suit is
appropriate to bring as a class action.141 The drafters of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure intended a simple inquiry, not a
determination of the merits.142 Professor Nagareda disagrees
and argues instead that the existence of a genuine dispute re-
garding Rule 23's certification requirements would necessitate a
judicial inquiry of the merits of the dispute in reference to any
Rule 23 requirement.143
An amicus curiae brief filed by civil procedure professors in
favor of Dukes' plaintiffs, however, adamantly argued against an
inquiry into the merits.144 In the forty-five years since the adop-
140 Brief for Lahav et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3,
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277) [hereinafter Brief for
the Respondents].
141 Id. at 5.
142 Green, supra note 2, at 6.
143 Nagareda, supra note 9, at 100.
144 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 140, at 8.
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tion of the class action litigation rule, no court has held that
Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement necessitates a determi-
nation of the merits.145 Courts have held that determinations
about certification are not binding on the merits of litigation.146
Even courts with a stringent view of certification requirements
agree that certification determines whether the requirements of
Rule 23 have been met and does not affect the merits of the
underlying claims.147
The essential question with respect to Rule 23(a) commonal-
ity is whether each case, if litigated separately, would require a
court to consider one or more of the same questions of law or
fact.148 This is the most effective question to ask with respect to
class certification because it considers relevant policy considera-
tions regarding class action and litigation, enforcing the substan-
tive law while simultaneously promoting economical, efficient
adjudication.149 While consideration of some facts may pertain
to evaluating the merits, the primary focus of the court should
be on Rule 23(a)'s requirements.150
The professors believed in the necessity of maintaining a sepa-
ration between Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirements and
Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance inquiry requirement, an argu-
ment that later appeared in Justice Ginsburg's dissent.151 If the
merits are evaluated during certification hearings, a strong
probability of importing the predominance requirement-a
more stringent judicial standard-into a Rule 23(a) inquiry ex-
ists.152 "It is well settled that 'all questions of law and fact need
not be common to satisfy [the commonality] requirement, and
the existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predi-
cates may be adequate.'""5 3
145 Id. at 6.
146 Id. at 8.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 10.
149 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 140, at 11.
150 Id. at 11-12.
151 Id. at 13.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 18.
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B. Lochnerian Jurisprudence and Wal-Mart's Defense of
Procedural Due Process
Business advocates appreciate and benefit from the higher
standard of proof established in Dukes for class certification.154
Robin Conrad, executive vice president of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce's National Chamber Litigation Center said,
"[The] ruling reinforces a fundamental principle of
fairness in our court systems: that defendants
should have the opportunity to present individual-
ized evidence to show they complied with the law.
Too often the class action device is twisted and
abused to force businesses to choose between set-
tling meritless lawsuits or potentially facing finan-
cial ruins."155
Mark Moller, a professor at DePaul University College of
Law, has written a lengthy response to this portion of Wal-
Mart's argument.156 A self-identified originalist, Moller argues
this aspect of Wal-Mart's argument is not compelling.'57 Wal-
Mart's claim that it has a right to mount a full defense by
presenting any probative evidence to rebut the plaintiff's asser-
tion of commonality is typical among defendants involved in
class action litigation.158 Defense attorneys appeal to salient
154 Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Erects Major Barriers to Class Actions in





ruling&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
155 Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Applauds Su-
preme Court Ruling in Wal-Mart v. Dukes (Jun. 20, 2011), available at http://
www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2011/j une/us-chamber-applauds-supreme
-court-ruling-wal-mart-v-dukes.
156 See Moller, supra note 65 at 319 n1.
157 Id. at 390.
158 Id. at 332.
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concerns about plaintiffs and courts abusing class action lawsuits
to pressure defendants into settling unmeritorious claims.159
There is no historical tradition supporting these types of due
process claims, however.160 In fact, historically, the judiciary has
had the right to limit the defendants' opportunities to present
evidence. 161 It was only during the Lochner era that the Court
created a new area of law that the conservative wing of the
Court is trying to bring back to life-procedural due process.162
Because the Lochner court treated property as a fundamental
interest, property merited a heightened level of Constitutional
protection, and thereby more procedural rights.163 As a result,
defendants demanded meaningful hearings, which included the
opportunity to present a "full defense" based on "any rebuttal
evidence they chose."' 64
Moller cited Wal-Mart's attempt to use due process as a clas-
sic example of trying to exercise non-existent procedural due
process rights.165 Moller argued that attempting to resurrect
Lochner in the name of originalism actually undermines the ar-
guments of class action defendants seeking to trump recent pre-
cedent.166 Thus, the Lochnerian view actually departs from a
historical understanding of the Due Process clause after the rati-
fication of the Fifth Amendment.167 It is a thinly veiled attempt
to improve corporate interests under the guise of originalism.
The Dukes majority wholly endorsed this aspect of Wal-
Mart's argument to promote and protect the interests of large
1s9 Id. at 320.
160 Id. at 390.
161 Moller, supra note 65, at 387-88.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 384.
164 Id. at 332.
165 Id. at 389. The rights are fictitiously imputed to fictitious people (i.e.
corporations) who are not entitled to receive those types of benefits, Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) never successfully obtained these rights for
corporations. Most gains associated with the Lochner era court for big busi-
ness were overturned in 1937, when the Court did a dramatic about-face with
respect to big business and laissez-faire economics.
166 Moller, supra note 65, at 390.
167 Id. at 391.
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corporations.16 8 Since the Court's refusal to certify the class in
Dukes, corporate defense attorneys have successfully litigated
and succeeded in preventing the certification of numerous class
actions in a variety of areas: overtime pay, insurance
overcharges, and litigation involving the release of toxins in a
residential neighborhood.169
Wal-Mart and its supporters repeatedly cited Dukes' and fel-
low plaintiffs' inability to point to any specific policies instituted
by the company that indicate a pattern of discrimination.17o
They claimed that the allegations against the company were
merely anecdotal, and not at all symptomatic of a greater prob-
lem within the corporation as a whole.' 7' Since the plaintiffs'
allegations were deemed anecdotal and lacking adequate proof,
Scalia deemed them unworthy of close consideration.
C. Dukes Creates a Lack of Incentive to Change
Corporate Policy
The majority's refusal to certify the Dukes class has broad le-
gal ramifications. The civil procedure professors who authored
the aforementioned amicus brief emphasized the important role
of class action lawsuits balancing access to the courts with effi-
cient adjudication.172 Unlike Rule 56 Motions for Summary
Judgment or Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss, the goal of class
certification is not to screen out lawsuits that fail to state an ade-
quate claim for relief.173 Class certification exists to determine
whether the class's essential purpose and policy (i.e. the afore-
mentioned goal of efficient litigation) is served by proceeding
forward in litigation as a class.174
168 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
169 Martha Burk, Wal-Mart's Gender Washing, Ms. MAGAZINE (Sep. 15,
2011), http://msmagazine.com/blog/blog/2011/09/15/wal-mart's-gender-wash-
ing/.
170 Ford, supra note 1, at 72.
171 Id.
172 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 140, at 1.
173 Id. at 2.
174 Id.
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With the more stringent standard of proof established in
Dukes serving as a prerequisite for certification, class action liti-
gation may be at a virtual end. If the Dukes class proceeded
successfully, the potential threat of courts imposing monetary
damages on corporations who fail to implement more stringent
policies would incentivize monolithic corporations like Wal-
Mart to either change or clearly codify their employment prac-
tices. As a result of the majority's refusal to certify the class, no
incentive exists for corporations to investigate and ferret out dif-
fuse discrimination endured by female or minority employees.
Corporations like Wal-Mart have no need to reign in the discre-
tion granted to its management team and modify its policies to
effectively police and prevent discrimination.
More importantly, large corporations have no motivation to
implement any kind of remedial measures or change the existing
culture or ethos to ensure a place for women and minorities.
Wal-Mart retains the ability to simply write policies prohibiting
the most egregious, overt acts of discrimination in conformance
with the bare bones requirements of Title VII and Title IX. As
long as courts deem clearly written corporate policies prohibit-
ing blatant discrimination on paper an adequate form of due dil-
igence, corporations will do nothing to proactively prevent
subtle, covert acts of discrimination against individuals.
V: THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS AND
EXPERT TESTIMONY
This part discusses the future of social framework analysis and
expert testimony. It outlines different theories of discrimination
as a basis for relief, and the changing burdens of proof before
and after Dukes. It describes the implications of a more strin-
gent burden of proof, implications for expert testimony regard-
ing social framework analysis in future class action litigation,
and relevant criticism of social framework testimony. This part
also describes the uses of social framework testimony, its con-
nection to the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the effect of bar-
ring social framework testimony on class action litigation.
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A. Burden of Proof Before and After the Dukes Litigation
Precedent prior to Dukes allowed the government to bring
civil actions under Title VII where there existed "reasonable
cause" to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged
in "a pattern or practice" of discrimination.175 The Court's re-
fusal to certify the class in Dukes indicates that a showing of
discrimination within an organization is no longer adequate;
now, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the employer adopted a
policy of discrimination.1 7 6
As previously stated, Dukes plaintiffs articulated two theories
in their pleadings as a basis for relief: systemic disparate treat-
ment theory and systemic disparate impact theory. 177 The
probability that a plaintiff will be able to meet the Dukes burden
of proof is minute at best. Requiring plaintiffs to meet this strin-
gent requirement also has serious implications for expert testi-
mony in class action litigation. Evidentiary testimony by experts
specializing in psychological and sociological fields has now
been rendered useless. Demonstrating a policy of discrimina-
tion requires proving that someone-likely a prominent officer
or administrator within the company-consciously chose to dis-
criminate.178 The social framework evidence presented by plain-
tiffs in Dukes-Dr. Bielby's social framework evidence and the
statistical regressions prepared by Dr. Drogin-failed to meet
the standard of "significant proof" demonstrating that the em-
ployer "has a company-wide policy of discrimination" because
of its perceived improbability to provide certainty.17 9
The standard described by Professor Nagareda and largely
adopted by Scalia in Dukes stated that plaintiffs' statistical evi-
dence was insufficient not only because it failed to demonstrate
a companywide policy of discrimination against women, but also
because women did not experience significantly more discrimi-
1s Green, supra note 2, at 404.
176 Id. at 405.
177 See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
178 Green, supra note 2, at 408.
179 Id. at 407.
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nation at Wal-Mart than they would in the broader context of
the labor market.180 This nebulous construction of discrimina-
tion. tacitly acknowledges that women face discrimination in the
labor market. The standard that Professor Nagareda articulated
does not deal with finding an ultimate end or remedy to sex dis-
crimination in the employment context; it simply states that the
discriminatory treatment women receive at one corporation can-
not be more egregious than at another, similar company.' 8'
B. Value of Social Framework Testimony in Class
Action Litigation
Law and society rarely tolerate overt acts of discrimination.182
Consequently, individuals and corporations in modern society
rarely discriminate overtly, consciously, and purposefully.183
Current psychological, sociological, and legal research indicates
that bias operates and influences peoples' behavior even absent
deliberate purpose, conscious animus, or overt prejudice.184 Pro-
fessor Linda Hamilton Krieger articulates that in order to estab-
lish liability in accordance with a theory of disparate treatment
discrimination, Title VII plaintiffs would need to establish that
being a member of a particular group was a factor in an em-
ployer's action or decision without proving a conscious intent to
discriminate.185
Social framework testimony submitted by the plaintiffs in
Dukes is a crucial component of numerous employment discrim-
ination suits.186 Many plaintiffs include expert testimony on this
subject to substantiate and contextualize claims of discrimina-
tory treatment in the workplace.' 87 Scholars cite subtle forms of
discrimination, particularly in the context of "subjective deci-
18o Id. at 413.
181 Nagareda, supra note 9, at 172.
182 Green, supra note 2, at 418.
183 Id.
184 Green, supra note 2, at 419.
185 Krieger, supra note 16, at 1186-88.
186 Hart, supra note 61, at 41.
187 Id.
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sion-making structures without sufficient guidance or monitor-
ing as likely to exclude or otherwise disadvantage women and
minorities in the workplace." 88 This research is particularly val-
uable in litigation associated with gender discrimination to de-
scribe phenomena that prevent female advancement in the
corporate world, including the "glass ceiling" and "maternal
wall" phenomena.189
When an expert gives social framework testimony to bolster a
plaintiff's claim, he or she helps identify problematic areas of a
company's policy that research typically associates with an in-
creased tendency towards prejudice and discrimination.190 Dr.
Bielby's testimony as an expert organizational psychologist
identified the extensive amount of managerial discretion for sal-
ary and promotional purposes as a factor that contributed to
bias and stereotyping.'91 The District Court judge accepted Dr.
Bielby's report in support of plaintiff's attempt to satisfy Rule
23(a)'s commonality requirement. However, Scalia's opinion
spilled considerable ink discrediting the report and the sur-
rounding evidence submitted by the plaintiffs. 192 The Supreme
Court's rejection of highly relevant social framework expert tes-
timony goes hand in hand with its refusal to certify the Dukes
class.'19 If the Court's refusal to acknowledge the authenticity
of Dr. Bielby and Dr. Drogin's work in Dukes serves as a litmus
test, the admissibility of social framework expert testimony in
188 Id.
189 Id. at 44. The "glass ceiling" refers to women and men who obtain the
same level of education and success, yet demonstrates the difficulty women
face when seeking professional advancement. The "maternal wall" refers to
the bias women encounter in the workplace because they are mothers.
Women dealing with the maternal wall phenomena describe feeling that, be-
cause colleagues discover they are mothers, they are assumed to be incompe-
tent and lack focus in their professional lives. See Bell et al., supra note 19, at
68 (discussing the glass ceiling). See also Hart, supra note 61, at 44-45 (dis-
cussing the barriers women face in the workplace).
190 Id. at 45.
191 Id. at 44.
192 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011).
193 Hart, supra note 61, at 39.
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future employment discrimination cases or class action lawsuits
is highly unlikely.
C. Criticism and Uses of Social Framework Testimony
Defendants cite the following criticisms of social framework
evidence: it is unhelpful to the jury; it is more prejudicial than
probative; there is no unanimity in the social science about re-
search related to the social framework analysis; studies done in a
lab cannot be generalized to the workplace; and experts cannot
accurately quantify the degree to which stereotyping influenced
decisions in the workplace. 1 94 The Federal Rules of Evidence do
not require absolute unanimity among experts to make their tes-
timony admissible as substantive evidence.195 Most defense ar-
guments in class action litigation attempt to rebut the validity of
plaintiff claims first by their essential validity and then by deny-
ing any attempt to prove commonality.196
The discovery process provides experts access to a wealth of
materials otherwise unavailable, including the employer's writ-
ten policies, the employer's personnel database, deposition testi-
mony, and other highly salient materials.197 Social framework
testimony helps shed light on how the policies of a particular
corporation could create a question common to a class of liti-
gants.198 It assists the trier of fact-particularly in complex liti-
gation-to reach a more thorough understanding of the
evidence before it, ensuring proper legal redress and due pro-
cess of law.199 A plaintiff's inability to obtain class certification
virtually cuts off the litigation at the knees. Barring this type of
194 Id. at 51.
195 Id.
196 See, generally Allan Erbsen, Aggregating and Resolving Dissimilar
Claims in Rule 23(b)(3) classes, SCOTUS blog, http://www.scotusblog.com/
2011/09/aggregating-and-resolving-dissimilar-claims-in-rule-23b3-classes/
(last accessed March 24, 2012)(discussing the typical defense strategy in class
certification proceedings).
197 Hart, supra note 61, at 54.
198 Id. at 63.
199 Green, supra note 2 at 447.
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evidence does more than prevent the plaintiff class from pro-
ceeding in litigation; it stifles any possibility of efficient legal re-
dress for the plaintiff class without any determination based on
the merits of their claims.
Allowing individuals to aggregate their claims meritorious of
redress through class action litigation provides a much higher
opportunity for success. It is rare that one person will have ade-
quate resources to find counsel comparable to that of a large
corporation, regardless of the strength of his or her case. When
contrasted with the defendant's argument about its right to due
process, the notion of dismissing a class out of hand is a much
more egregious violation of a plaintiff's right to due process of
law.
Based on the stringent burden of proof in Dukes, combined
with the Court's refusal to acknowledge the validity of social
framework evidence, class action lawsuits against corporations
will continue to be defeated. The newly established burden of
proof on plaintiffs will ensure maintenance of the status quo in
favor of a more laissez-fair approach to business regulation.
Corporations will continue using decentralized, discretionary
personnel policies that disadvantage women and minorities
while closing off viable options for formal legal redress.
VI. ALTERNATIVE AVENUES OF REDRESS
This part describes potential avenues of redress for the Dukes
plaintiffs including: filing smaller class action lawsuits, the impo-
sition of tort liability theory against corporations, and a volun-
tary refund program for consumers as an alternative to class
action litigation. This part also uses the example of Home De-
pot as a large corporation that chose a proactive path towards
change through internal reform of its employment practices.
In Dukes, the Supreme Court foreclosed the possibility of
back pay based on Wal-Mart's Lochnerian argument favoring
procedural due process.2oo Not all attorneys, however, think
200 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).
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that Wal-Mart will escape liability.20 1 Brad Seligman, attorney
for the plaintiffs, maintained that "Wal-Mart is not off the
hook."202 The plaintiffs can splinter off from the class and pur-
sue individual claims against Wal-Mart, either through the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or in court.203
The Court never reached the actual issue of whether Wal-Mart
did or did not discriminate against its female employees. 204 It
will be difficult, however, for plaintiffs to go up against Wal-
Mart. The legal and financial resources available to Wal-Mart
certainly differ tremendously from women who used to work
there and make minimum wage, providing a huge disincentive
for them to bring suit against the corporate monolith.
A. Smaller Class Action Suits
There is potential for members of the Dukes plaintiff class to
bring smaller class action lawsuits against Wal-Mart instead of
proceeding as a gigantic class.205 Equal Rights Advocates
("ERA"), a civil rights organization committed to advancing the
cause of equal opportunity for women, is working in conjunction
with three private law firms to participate in a smaller class ac-
tion suit.206 ERA is reviewing and assessing the claims of poten-
tial class members and determining new potential classes for
reorganization.207 Proceeding forward with the litigation, even
on a smaller scale, however, would be challenging for most
plaintiffs attempting to aggregate their claims; they will have to
keep the newly revamped, stringent standard of proof in mind.
With the Court setting the bar so high, it is unlikely that the
plaintiffs in Dukes would be able to aggregate their claims suc-
201 Mauro, supra note 154.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2565.
205 Mauro, supra note 154.
206 Judy Patrick, Walmart Decision Raises the Question, How Will Women





cessfully on a smaller scale. Additionally, it may be cost prohib-
itive for women making minimum wage to hire attorneys
capable of effectively litigating against Wal-Mart.
B. Tort Theories of Employer Liability
Another potential avenue of redress for the Dukes plaintiffs
would include a legal paradigm shift with respect to systemic
disparate treatment theory. Borrowed from criminal law, the
principal-agent view imposes liability on corporate entities for
failing to adequately police the actions of individual employ-
ees. 2 0 8 The principal-agent view essentially imposes a version of
respondeat superior on companies who refuse to implement ad-
equate measures to prevent discrimination by their employ-
ees.209 The principal-agent theory holds tremendous appeal
because it attacks instances of discrimination against identifiably
vulnerable individuals.210
Tristin K. Green, professor at University of San Francisco
School of Law, espoused a slightly different viewpoint he terms
"entity liability."211 Entity liability addresses institutional influ-
ence on individual behavior, exploring whether the environment
within the four walls of a particular institution exerts influence
on the behavior of its employees.212 Green based his theory on
social science research demonstrating that people act within the
context created by their employers.213 Title VII already imposes
liability on employers for their own discriminatory acts as well
as those of their appointed agents-whether they knew of them
or not.2 1 4 Research demonstrates that corporations promoting
the achievement of "bottom line results" are more likely to have
legal and ethical violations.215 By contrast, if employees believe





213 Green, supra note 2, at 399.
214 Id. at 423.
215 Id. at 435.
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strongly in upper management's commitment to ethically and
socially desirable conduct, that belief would positively contrib-
ute to establishing a corporate ethos of compliance.216
Under the theory of entity liability, Green proposes that the
employer is held responsible for its actions; its responsibility
turns not just on particular incidents of disparate treatment, but
its role in promoting disparate treatment. 217 According to entity
liability, individuals act within the context of an organization or
institution that the corporate entities themselves actively
shape. 218 If a corporation knew that it would be directly liable
for promoting disparate treatment under entity liability, it would
proactively take steps to rectify potentially detrimental policies
by policing individual behavior and taking steps to reduce dis-
crimination throughout the entire corporate enterprise.219
C. Voluntary Refund Program
In a radical departure from the aforementioned means of
resolving plaintiffs' desire for redress, Eric Voight suggests an
option entirely outside the realm of class action litigation: a re-
fund program established by the defendant corporation to pre-
empt class action lawsuits.220 Voight argues that class action
litigation often benefits the attorneys at the expense of class
members, who rarely receive sufficient compensation.221 In-
stead, companies can circumvent the entire process of class ac-
tion litigation by receiving legal and financial incentives to
establish a voluntary refund program. 222 Establishing a volun-
tary refund program increases corporate revenue, conserves ju-
dicial time, and circumvents the average time of over three years
216 Id.
217 Id. at 436.
218 Green, supra note 2, at 438-39.
219 Id. at 438.
220 Eric P. Voight, A Company's Voluntary Refund Program for Consumers
can be a Fair and Efficient Alternative to a Class Action to Warrant the Denial
of Class Certification, REV. OF LITIG. 617, 618 (2012).
221 Id. at 619.
222 Id. at 620-21.
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for settling class action litigation.223 Voight cites the language of
the Advisory Committee notes indicating that "other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy" include non-judicial methods like the voluntary refund
program. 224
In the context of the Dukes litigation, a voluntary refund pro-
gram would be inappropriate because the Supreme Court's re-
fusal to certify the class provides little or no incentive for Wal-
Mart to take proactive steps to alter the status quo. Voight's
interpretation of the intent behind Rule 23, however, is quite
innovative. If the standard established in Dukes effectively bars
future advancement of employment discrimination class action
litigation, plaintiff lawyers will need to start thinking outside of
the box to achieve legal and equitable relief for their clients.
D. Successful Intra-Corporate Reform: The Home
Depot Example
In addition to lawyers thinking outside of the box, corpora-
tions can also proactively seek to reform their policies to pre-
vent employment discrimination.225 Susan Sturm points out the
advantages and importance of innovative internal problem solv-
ing within corporations. 226 She describes three large corpora-
tions who successfully implemented unique measures to combat
discrimination internally: Deloitte Touche, Intel, and Home De-
pot.2 2 7 The example of Home Depot nearly mirrored that of the
Dukes litigation, where a number of female Home Depot em-
ployees brought a class action lawsuit alleging gender discrimi-
nation with respect to hiring, promotion, and salary as a result of
subjective decision-making processes. 228 However, the Home
223 Id. at 621.
224 Id. at 625.
225 Sturm, supra note 26, at 491.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 510.
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Depot litigation was resolved through a court ordered media-
tion process ending in a global settlement and consent decree.229
A key component of the Home Depot consent decree in-
cluded the implementation of an automated hiring and promo-
tional system called Job Preference Process ("JPP").230 JPP is
an in-store system that installed computer and phone kiosks
where employees can register their job preferences, describe
their relevant qualifications, and indicate future positions of in-
terest within the company.231 Because the JPP system is entirely
automated, it eliminated the potential for managers to exercise
influence on employees based on stereotypes, expanded the
pool of applicants for positions, and provided additional ave-
nues of advancement for employees.232 While the JPP system
may be problematic because of its mechanical replacement of a
person's ability to factor intangible qualities into the hiring pro-
cess, it is a very innovative approach to the problem of eliminat-
ing bias and discrimination in the workplace.
It is unclear why Wal-Mart chose not to pursue this avenue of
redress when the facts of each respective case are so substan-
tially similar. Wal-Mart likely chose not to pursue this course of
action because it lacked motivation. However, if the govern-
ment were to grant tax breaks to large corporations choosing to
implement policies combating sex discrimination, financial in-
centives would likely spur them into action. Additionally, if
companies volitionally set progressive policies in motion, they
could reap the benefits. Corporations could improve their im-
age in the media, increase their job applicant pool, and poten-
tially increase revenue from their customer bases.
229 Id. at 511.
230 Sturm, supra note 26, at 512.
231 Id. at 513.
232 Id. at 514.
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VII. CONCLUSION-INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS TO
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
The majority's decision in Dukes has significant ramifications
for Rule 23 and future class action litigation. The majority's re-
fusal to certify the class creates a stringent burden of proof for
future class action lawsuits. Additionally, the Court's refusal to
acknowledge the validity of social framework evidence simulta-
neously creates an impossibly high bar for the burden of proof
while providing virtually no incentive for corporations to modify
existing personnel policies that disadvantage women and minor-
ities. Dukes demonstrates that a cultural bias against women
and their professional advancement continues to exist through-
out corporate America, and will continue to go unpunished.
Dukes' plaintiffs alleged that they were told to "dust the cob-
webs off of their make-up" and "doll up" appropriately for
work.2 3 3 Plaintiffs also alleged that they were addressed in con-
descending gendered terms and had to sit through meetings
scheduled by management at Hooter's. 234 Despite these allega-
tions, the majority in Dukes never attempted to reach the ques-
tion of whether Wal-Mart did, in fact, discriminate against its
female employees; it refused to even acknowledge the problem
of employment discrimination against women.235 While Justice
Ginsburg's dissent acknowledged that "gender bias suffused
Wal-Mart's company culture," neither the majority opinion nor
the dissent acknowledged employment discrimination against
women as an ongoing problem. 236
The Supreme Court's refusal to acknowledge employment
discrimination against women as a pervasive issue mirrors the
attitude of American society.237 Overt demonstrations of bias
and animus against groups with innate, unalterable characteris-
233 Hortense Spillers, Another Day at the Races, THE FEMINIST WIRE (June
24, 2011), http://thefeministwire.com/2011/06/another-day-at-the-races/
234 Weiss, supra note 3, at 154-55.
235 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2565 (2011).
236 Id.
237 Ford, supra note 1, at 75; See also Krieger, supra note 16, at 1186-88.
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tics are rare. 2 3 8 Yet discrimination continuously operates at a
more subliminal, individualized level to disadvantage women
and minorities.239
From its beginnings, feminism has blossomed into a quest for
true equal protection under the law: ensuring that women could
make authentic choices with the same freedom as their male
counterparts. 240 Today, equal choices for women exist exclu-
sively on paper. The passage of the Equal Pay Act, Title VII,
and Title IX ensures that formalized discrimination against
women is unacceptable. 241 Women are no longer barred from
obtaining education at the best institutions of higher learning or
pursuing any career they choose; they consistently outnumber
their male cohorts at virtually every level of higher education.242
Yet statistics reliably demonstrate that women receive fewer
promotions, earn less (both monetarily and in terms of reputa-
tional prestige), advance more slowly, and often endure sexual
harassment.243
Since formal legal redress continuously fails to provide ade-
quate solutions to workplace discrimination against women and
minorities, it appears that innovative, non-formalistic ap-
proaches warrant further exploration. While existing laws re-
main important, formal and informal education should become
readily available for women seeking guidance and professional
advancement.24 A combination of formal and informal organi-
zational efforts-both from external pressures as well as inter-
nally driven policies within corporate America-must be made
to reduce sex discrimination. Women must be employed in non-
238 Green, supra note 2, at 418-19 (discussing how acts of overt discrimina-
tion declined after the enactment of Title VII).
239 Id. (discussing social science research); See also generally Hart supra note
61.
240 See generally Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, October
26, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/26/magazine/the-opt-
out-revolution.html?scp=5&sq=opt+out+revolution&st=nyt.
241 Bell et. al., supra note 19, at 65.
242 See Belkin, supra note 240.
243 Bell et. al, supra note 19, at 65.
244 Wolford, supra note 20, at 93.
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stereotyped positions, involved in decision-making and policy-
making processes, and paid on par with their male
counterparts. 245
While it is impossible to eradicate all instances of discrimina-
tion, it is possible for companies to promote policies and remain
sensitive towards women and minorities deserving of elevated
legal protection in the workplace. By providing financial and/or
tax incentives through more progressive legislation-at local,
federal, and state levels-large corporations would benefit from
promoting and protecting women's rights in their hiring, promo-
tion, advancement, and retention policies. An innovative,
proactive effort within corporations to end sex discrimination in
the workplace would create a more positive corporate ethos as
well as a more productive workforce. Without any external cat-
alysts or motivation to kick-start the process, however, it re-
mains highly improbable that corporations will change existing
policies.
In addition to the solutions proposed in this note, it is the re-
sponsibility of women and women's advocates to act individu-
ally as well as collectively to alter the existing status quo. In
order to truly remedy the existing problems of racism and sex-
ism we see manifested in cases like Dukes, women need to real-
ize the value of continuing to work together to achieve the
ultimate goal of the feminist movement: an authentic exercise of
choice and autonomy of women everywhere.
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